From: Eugene Frison <cthulhu_calls.nul> Date: Wed, 2 May 2012 21:26:48 -0500 Archived: Thu, 03 May 2012 07:42:38 -0400 Subject: Re: Ufology And Psychiatry - Summary >From: Cathy Reason <Cathym.nul> >To: UFO UpDates - Toronto <post.nul> >Date: Mon, 30 Apr 2012 18:11:15 +0100 >Subject: Re: Ufology And Psychiatry - Summary >>From: Eugene Frison <cthulhu_calls.nul> >>To: <post.nul> >>Date: Fri, 27 Apr 2012 21:47:40 -0500 >>Subject: Re: Ufology And Psychiatry - Summary >>For merely giving a list of methods used by science, I was >>accused of believing that the scientific method was a >>complicated and complex thing, of being obsessed with "elaborate >>methodological ritual" and of possessing a "reverence for >>logic." Simply for making a list. >Ok, let's leave aside your claims about the reliability of human >perception, since I think we've established that these hinge >entirely on your rather idiosyncratic notion of reliability. >Never mind. Let's turn to your other claims. No... let's not "leave aside" my claims about the reliability of the human perception system. Let's not just "never mind". We are going to continue this aspect of the discussion. First of all, these are not just _my_ claims. This is a claim made by many scientists and they have produced a hefty amount of evidence to back it up. Secondly, we have not done any such thing as "establish that these hinge entirely on my rather idiosyncratic notion of reliability." These claims were made by others long before I even got interested in them, so it simply can't be that they rest on _my_ "idiosyncratic notion of reliability," let alone "entirely". What they do hinge on is hard fact from scientific research and everyday observation. >First, you claim that much or most of psychology does not depend >on "operationalisms". Let's clear up one potential source of >confusion at the outset - what actually do you mean by >"operationalisms", a term you appear to have invented? If you >mean operationalized measures, then your claim is simply untrue, >since pretty much the whole of modern psychology relies on >operationalized definitions of one sort or another. This >includes the qualitative methods such as Participant Observation >which I believe you referred to in an earlier post. If you know >of any significant examples to the contrary, then I think it's >time you produced them. The word "operationalisms" should not have been written with an 's.' "Operationalism" is the doctrine. I intended to write "operationalizations". Sorry for that confusion. These posts have gotten unduly long at times, and, to be quite frank, I have not had the interest to go back and edit them before sending them out. That should clear up the confusion. Now, on to your false accusation above. You say, "you claim that much or most of psychology does not depend on "operationalisms." Well, that is not what I claim at all. Go back and reread my post. My exact words were, "psychological research was much more than the use of operationalisms." Of course modern psychology depends on operationalized definitions of one sort or another, as you say. But: the social sciences (including psychology) use an eclectic mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods to gather data and this approach is known as "mixed-methods research." Qualitative methods can and do include quantitative dimensions. Quantitative methods can give exact and testable expression to qualitative ideas. Measurement can provide the connection between empirical observation and the mathematical expressions of quantitative relationships. If you're going to accuse me of something, at least accuse me of the right thing. Make the correct accusation, please, based on what I actually say and not on what you think I am saying. >On the other hand if you mean something else by >"operationalisms", then perhaps you can explain what that is. I mean "operationalizations". At times I meant to write "operationalism" to refer to the doctrine itself, but at other times I meant to refer to "operationalizations", i.e. operationalized measures. You are correct to point out my lazy and improper use of these terms by my interchanging them. >Second, you claim that even if it is true that all modern >psychology depends on operational measures, and even if these >measures are systemnatically flawed, this would not alter the >big picture for psychology. How you think the big picture for >psychology would remain unchanged even if the whole basis of its >observations were shown to be systematically corrupted is a >mystery to me. Perhaps you can explain. Nope, sorry. Never claimed this. I claimed that even if every time psychological research uses an operationalization, it confused operational notions of things with proxy notions of things, it would not destroy psychology. For this to happen, every one of psychology's premises, models, observations, perceived relationships, etc. would have to be dead wrong. This is not the case. As you say, most of modern psychology is based on Cognitivism. But there was psychology long before Cognitivism. There will be psychology long after Cognitivism. Cognitivism began to take root in the 1950's. Meyers was published in 1903. Even if Cognitivism was shown to be complete crap and totally erased from the picture, there would still be psychology. Cognitivism has numbered days, as the post-cognitivists are proposing better ideas. The big picture won't change because the big picture is that Cognitivism is doomed; nothing is going to change this. You clearly had your own ideas as to what I meant by the big picture of psychology and, as usual, they had nothing in common with what I was referring to. It's very, very simple. It is my contention that every time psychology uses an operationalization, it is not guilty of confusing operational notions of things with proxy notions of things, and that it is not always starting out with bad premises. Some of its premises - such as the one that human perception is flawed - are indeed factual and are a good basis from which to start. If you're starting out with a healthy premise - such as one based on everyday observation and backed up with repeatible and reproducible empirical experimentation - then you're not always going to end up with bad results if you apply a methodology that conforms to the standards of the scientific method. Many of psychology's experimentation _is_ both repeatable and reproducible. (Repeatable refers to getting the same results by the same researcher, using the same eqiupment, lab conditions, etc over a short period of time. Reproducible means getting the same results by various researchers, in different locations, over a long period of time. I mention this just to avoid confusion.) >Third, you appear to be suggesting that since psychology uses a >lot of complicated statistical procedures, and since a lot of >these procedures are used in other sciences, then psychology >must be a science. This is faulty logic. It isn't the technique >that makes a science, but how it is used. The best method in the >world will only yield nonsense results if it is used on bad >observational data. Is this how it appears to you? Where did I suggest "psychology uses a lot of complicated statistical proceedures"? It was _you_ who brought up the word "complicated" - during your accustion of my being obsessed with "elaborate methodological ritual". Remember? All I ever said or implied was that one of the methods used in psychological research was statistical analysis. An that this is an accepted method of obtaining data, used in many other fields of science. I am not saying that "since a lot of these proceedures are used in other sciences, then psychology must be a science." Go back and re-read my posts. You are falsely accusing me of this. I simply gave a short list of methods that conform to the standards of the scientific method and stated that psychological research uses these same methods. (These methods went way beyond statistical analysis.) Psychological research employs the accepted methodologies of the scientific method. You simply can't claim that every time psychological research attempts to use one of the methods that conform to the standards of the scientific method that it is starting off with nonsense in its attempt to apply that method. This is sheer folly. >Lastly you claim that most psychology does not depend on >Cognitivism. In an earlier post I listed the Gibsonians, the >psychophysicists and a handful of applied (that is, >atheoretical) experimenters as examples that don't. To these I >should have added some counseling psychologists and a handful of >Behaviorists (there are still some of these knocking around >somewhere). But that's about it. If you know of any other >examples, then once again, I think it's time you produced them. No. Another false accusation from you. Go back and re-read my posts. I agreed with you that Cognitivism was the dominant factor in psychology. I even stated that it has been this way since Noam Chomsky did his number on Behaviouralism. You are clearly misunderstanding what I mean when I say that psychology is more than Cognitivisim. But that has been a regular and consistent feature of this disccusion. There are many systems within psychology. There is good within each of these systems. There is bad within each of these systems. The point is that something good can be salvaged from each system and what is not good should be discarded. Every system - from the Humanism of William James, to Behaviouralism (Cognitivism is not a complete rejection of Behaviouralism), to the various 'depth psychologies' (such as the "psychoanalysis" of Freud, and the "analytical psychology' of Jung), to the Gestalt's, right up to the newer ideas of the post-cognitivists and the transpersonal psychology of Groff and Tart, all have something to contribute. This is what I meant when I said in an earlier post that psychology will not disappear but will continue to improve itself and grow. Since the 1990's, post-cognitivist ideas such as 'embodied cognition', 'embodied embedded cognition', 'situated cognition', 'ecological psychology', etc. are starting to take psychology past Cognitivism. Sure, Jame's J. Gibson's 'direct realism' is a post-cognitive proposition but it went too far and is shown to be wrong by modern physics. I never claimed psychology is perfect. In fact, I stated in my very first posts that it had a lot wrong with it. But it _is_ science. Not all of its premises are wrong. It will sort out its mistakes and advance, just like every other field of science has had to do. Listen to 'Strange Days... Indeed' - The PodCast At: http://www.virtuallystrange.net/ufo/sdi/program/ These contents above are copyright of the author and UFO UpDates - Toronto. They may not be reproduced without the express permission of both parties and are intended for educational use only.
[ Next Message | Previous Message | This Day's Messages ]
This Month's Index |
UFO UpDates - Toronto - Operated by Errol Bruce-Knapp